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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2000, Zimbabwe has embarked upon a controversial fast-
track land reform program to redistribute large commercial farms 
mostly owned by white farmers to landless black Zimbabweans who 
were dispossessed during colonialism.1 Today, the program 
 
 1. See Blair Rutherford, The Rough Contours of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 
29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103-05 (2005) (reporting that in the first five years 
of the land reform program, Zimbabwe acquired 5,890 commercial farms and 
slated them for resettlement for landless beneficiaries); cf. Hasani Claxton, Land 
and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective Land Reform Policy in South 
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continues to spark controversy and violence against white 
landowners.2 On October 26, 2010, Kobus Jobert became another 
victim of the chaotic land reform program, when his wife was 
assaulted and he was murdered in his home by a gang, after his home 
was identified for redistribution.3 In spite of the violence resulting 
from the land reform program, individual blacks own no more land 
today than they did during the colonial period.4 
This comment explores the reasons why Amendments 16A and 
16B of the Zimbabwean Constitution, which authorize fast-track land 
reform, violate minimum international standards regarding the right 
to property and due process.5 Part I will explain how Zimbabwe’s 
colonial history has led to its current drastic land reform policy.6 It 
 
Africa, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 529, 544 (2003) (stressing that land reform, 
implemented fairly, may be one of the most effective ways to ease economic 
disparities and racial tensions for future generations). 
 2. See Leah Hyslop, White Farmers in Zimbabwe Struggle against Increasing 
Violence, THE TELEGRAPH (June 11, 2010), http://www. telegraph.co.uk/expat/ 
expatnews/7818110/White-farmers-in-Zimbabwe-struggle-against-increasing-
violence.html (reporting an increase in arrests and land seizures by local 
government activists in mid-2010). But see Andrew Hartnack, Transcending 
Global and National (Mis)representations Through Local Responses to 
Displacement: The Case of Zimbabwean (Ex-)Farm Workers, 22 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 351, 363-64 (2009) (revealing that more blacks who work on white-owned 
commercial farms have been killed and beaten than white farmers, but their plight 
has been far less publicized). 
 3. See Tererai Karimakwenda, White Commercial Farmer Shot and Killed in 
Chegutu, SW RADIO AFRICA (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.swradioafrica. 
com/news271010/whitecom271010.htm (elaborating that the 67-year-old white 
farmer was shot in the head, and US$10,000 was stolen from his home); see also 
Lebo Nkatazo, Two Held over Farmer’s Murder, NEW ZIMBABWE.COM (Nov. 24, 
2010), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion.aspx?newsID =3884 
(explaining that the Commercial Farmers Union is hesitating to claim a political 
motivation behind Jobert’s murder). 
 4. See Thomas W. Mitchell, The Land Crisis in Zimbabwe: Getting Beyond 
the Myopic Focus upon Black & White, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 587, 593 
(2001) (arguing that despite efforts to reverse the effects of colonial laws that 
barred blacks from buying land, the government has resisted distributing any 
ownership rights, and has instead issued non-freehold tenure and leases. 
 5. See discussion infra Parts III-IV (arguing the numerous international law 
standards that Amendments 16A and 16B contradict, including the prohibition on 
racial discrimination, arbitrary deprivation of property, denial of fair 
compensation, and inability to access courts). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A (explaining that Zimbabwe has  taken extreme 
measures to reach its land reform goals, which has, in turn, caused violence, 
economic instability, and human rights violations). 
136 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:1 
will further define the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) which guarantee the right to 
property and due process of the law.7  
Part II will argue that although land reform is needed in 
Zimbabwe, its current law is arbitrary, racially discriminatory, 
disregards due process, and denies compensation for property 
takings.8 It will further argue that the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal’s decision that Zimbabwe’s land 
reform is discriminatory and denies access to the courts conforms to 
international standards, and that Zimbabwe is required to follow it.9 
Part III recommends that Zimbabwe recognize the SADC 
Tribunal’s decision and implement its judgment domestically.10 This 
section also encourages Zimbabwe to amend its constitution to meet 
international standards.11 Lastly, the Comment concludes that 
Zimbabwe is currently heading down a dangerous path, which 
isolates it and decreases its legitimacy within the international 
community.12 Thus, if Zimbabwe changes its law to respect human 
rights standards, it can begin to rectify these errors.13  
I. BACKGROUND 
When President Mugabe became the first president of the 
independent Zimbabwe in 1980, he pledged to undo the devastating 
 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.C (stating the minimum international standards 
to which all states must comply). 
 8. Cf. discussion infra Part II (referring to Articles 15 of the UDHR and 14 of 
the Banjul Charter on the right to property, and Articles 8 of the UDHR and 7(1)(a) 
of the Banjul Charter on the right to due process). 
 9. See discussion infra Part II (noting that Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court has 
stated that, under most circumstances, as long as public policy is not contradicted, 
it should adhere to SADC Tribunal decisions). 
 10. See discussion infra Part III.A, C (suggesting that in the absence of this 
development, potential plaintiffs should continue to make use of foreign and 
regional courts). 
 11. See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that Zimbabwe could meet 
international standards by moving towards negotiated land reform instead of 
compulsory acquisitions). 
 12. See discussion infra CONCLUSION (observing that nations that have 
previously supported Zimbabwe have distanced themselves since Zimbabwe began 
its fast-track land reform program). 
 13. See id. (encouraging Zimbabwe to take tangible steps to reform its laws). 
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effects of colonialism and improve the plight of oppressed Africans 
in Zimbabwe.14 Since land reform efforts have begun, Mugabe has 
not met this promise, as black Zimbabweans who have received land 
in redistribution often have limited resources or insufficient funds to 
productively use the land they are given.15 Remaining white 
landowners have insecure tenure and are victimized by those 
carrying out violent evictions.16 Investors are hesitant to invest 
money in Zimbabwe because there is insecure tenure and no promise 
of fair compensation for redistributed property.17 Over 500,000 ex-
farm workers have become internally displaced after their employers 
were evicted from land.18 Today, these tensions pervade public 
policy, economics, and legal discourse.19  
A. ZIMBABWE’S POST-INDEPENDENCE LAND REFORM EFFORTS  
When Zimbabwe gained independence from Great Britain in 1980, 
it agreed to restrict compulsory land expropriations for ten years.20 
 
 14. But cf. Nick Dancaescu, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 615, 
618 (2003) (recounting that at independence, Zimbabwe was considered a shining 
example of an African nation that was able to cast off the burdens of colonialism). 
 15. See Heather Boyle, Note, The Land Problem: What does the Future Hold 
for South Africa’s Land Reform Program?, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 665, 
696 (2001) (claiming that redistribution of land in Zimbabwe is ineffective because 
the people receiving land do not have the knowledge or tools to make it 
productive); see also Ngoni Chanakira, White farmer takes farm back, NEW 
ZIMBABWE.COM (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/print 
Version.aspx?newsID=4197 (revealing that some of the land reform program’s 
beneficiaries have actually re-leased the land they were given to its former owner, 
because the new beneficiary lacks the resources to effectively use the land). 
 16. See Karimakwenda, supra note 3 (recounting deaths and assaults on white 
farmers from violent land invasions and evictions). 
 17. Bureau of Afr. Affairs, Background Note: Zimbabwe, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Nov. 
3, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm#econ (stating that investor 
confidence remains low in Zimbabwe because of tenure insecurity and the land 
reform laws). 
 18. See Hartnack, supra note 2, at 351 (recounting the obstacles and stigma that 
ex-farm workers face, including exclusion from redistribution allotments, if they 
support the interests of their “white bosses”). 
 19. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 1, at 103 (contrasting Zimbabwe’s 
polarized image either as a “land sinking into quagmire and poverty or as a land at 
the forefront of the battle against racist Western imperialism”); see also Bureau of 
Afr. Affairs, supra note 17 (revealing that Zimbabwe’s economy has contracted 
forty percent since 1999 and large scale commercial farming has mostly collapsed 
due to aggressive land reform laws). 
 20. See Agreements Concluded at Lancaster House Conference, U.K.-Zim. 
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During these years, Zimbabwe used a “willing buyer, willing seller” 
method to redistribute land.21 This voluntary land redistribution 
method allowed individuals to purchase land from private 
landowners with government loans.22 While this program did 
redistribute some land, critics complained that the process moved too 
slowly.23 
In 1992, Zimbabwe passed the Land Acquisition Act to allow the 
government to acquire land compulsorily from owners, accompanied 
by fair compensation for the property.24 Seven years into the 
 
Rhodesia, Annex C, pt. C, § V(1), pt. E, para. 30, Nov. 22, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 387 
(1980) [hereinafter Lancaster Agreement] (allowing any property the government 
acquires to be contested in court and entitling the former owner to adequate and 
prompt compensation, and limiting changes of this provision for the first ten years 
after its passage by requiring a unanimous vote in the House Assembly and two-
thirds vote in the Senate to repeal it); see also Jonathan Shirley, Note, The Role of 
International Human Rights and the Law of Diplomatic Protection in Resolving 
Zimbabwe’s Land Crisis, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 162 (2004) 
(conveying that Great Britain put  limitations on property acquisition to protect 
white farmers in majority-ruled Zimbabwe). 
 21. See David Shriver, Note, Rectifying Land Ownership Disparities Through 
Expropriation: Why Recent Land Reform Measures in Namibia are 
Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 
433 (2005) (defining the “willing buyer, willing seller” method as a system used to 
voluntarily transfer land from colonial landowners to previously disenfranchised 
stakeholders). At the time, Great Britain also agreed to contribute funding to allow 
the Zimbabwean government to purchase land.  Id.; cf. Claxton, supra note 1, at 
541 (comparing this agreement to Kenya’s, in which the government agreed not to 
compulsorily expropriate land in exchange for foreign funding). 
 22. Cf. Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize et al., Introduction and Summary, in 
AGRICULTURAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION: TOWARDS GREATER CONSENSUS 3, 21 
(Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize et al. eds., 2009) (differentiating Zimbabwe’s 
program from Namibia’s, in which all private landowners were required to offer 
their land to be purchased by the government before attempting to sell it on the 
market, giving the government a “right of first refusal” for all property). 
 23. See Shriver, supra note 21, at 447 (quoting Namibia’s Prime Minister who 
found that the willing-buyer, willing-seller approach was overly cumbersome to 
reach the land reform programs’ ultimate goals); see also Claxton, supra note 1, at 
544 (arguing that market-based land reform tactics are not sufficient in nations that 
engage in widespread restructuring of land distribution).  But see Bill H. Kinsey, 
Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe’s 
Resettlement Programme, 25 J. S. AFR. STUD. 173, 177-78 (1999) (emphasizing 
that despite criticisms, Zimbabwe’s voluntary land reform program, to date, has 
significantly outpaced all other such programs in sub-Saharan Africa). 
 24. See Land Acquisition Act (Act No. 3/1992), as amended, c. 20:10, § 
29C(1) (Zim.) (requiring just compensation for all land acquired for redistribution 
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program, by 1999, 71,000 black families had been resettled.25 In 
2000, Zimbabwean voters rejected a constitutional referendum that 
would have allowed the government to further implement its fast-
track land reform program based primarily on compulsory land 
acquisitions.26 Instead of accepting defeat, President Mugabe and 
Parliament passed constitutional Amendments 16A and 16B, which 
allow the government to acquire land without safeguards to prevent 
arbitrary application, guarantees to due process, or compensation.27  
Amendment 16A requires Great Britain, instead of Zimbabwe, to 
pay landowners for their expropriated property.28 It justifies this by 
claiming that Great Britain has the responsibility to pay because it 
colonized Zimbabwe and dispossessed legitimate owners by 
 
or any other purpose); see also BRIAN MACGARRY, LAND FOR WHICH PEOPLE?: 
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 17 (1994) (explaining that the Lancaster 
Agreement made it much easier for Zimbabwe to do large-scale land acquisitions 
only after 1990). 
 25. See, e.g., Shirley, supra note 20, at 163 (emphasizing that these 71,000 
families were resettled through government purchases of 3.8 million hectares of 
land, using fair compensation as the payment standard). But see Boyle, supra note 
15, at 693 (referring to evidence that Zimbabwe has redistributed land corruptly, 
and that some recipients of redistributed land are not those most in need, but 
President Mugabe’s political cronies). 
 26. See Zimbabwe says no, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 16, 2000), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/feb/16/zimbabwe.guardianleaders 
(reporting that Mugabe severely miscalculated his political strength, leading to the 
rejection of his referendum); see also Rutherford, supra note 1, at 104 (naming this 
defeat as a landmark moment for Zimbabwe because it was the first time the ruling 
party faced real opposition to its policies). 
 27. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16A(2) (listing factors that may affect assessments for compensation for 
improvements, but not mentioning factors that should be used to determine which 
land to target) (preventing landowners from applying to courts to challenge 
acquisitions)  (prohibiting compensation for land acquired for redistribution, 
except for improvements); see also Anne Hellum & Bill Derman, Land Reform 
and Human Rights in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Balancing Individual and Social 
Justice Through an Integrated Human Rights Framework, 32 WORLD DEV. 1785, 
1792 (2004) (recounting that after the referendum was rejected, Mugabe 
introduced the exact same words into an April 2000 amendment, which was then 
adopted by Parliament). 
 28. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16A(1)(c) (“The former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for 
agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, . . . and if the former 
colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the Government of 
Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land 
compulsorily acquired for resettlement.”) 
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promulgating and enforcing racist laws.29 Amendment 16B 
eliminates notice requirements for land redistribution and prevents 
landowners from challenging government acquisitions in an 
independent court.30 After these changes were made, violent land 
seizures gripped Zimbabwe, with so-called “war veterans” invading 
large commercial farms and violently forcing out the owners.31  
B. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY UNDER THE UDHR AND THE BANJUL 
CHARTER  
International law is somewhat ambiguous on the minimum 
standard for an individual’s right to property, and when a violation of 
that right occurs.32 International courts have been hesitant to protect 
 
 29. See id. art. 16A(1)(a)-(c) (naming the most important factors related to land 
redistribution: 1) that the people in Zimbabwe were unjustifiably dispossessed of 
their land during colonial domination; 2) that Zimbabwe regained independence by 
taking up arms against the colonizers; and 3) that to reassert their rights and regain 
ownership to their land, Zimbabwe should be able to compulsorily acquire land 
from current owners without paying them).  But see Shriver, supra note 21, at 451 
(questioning the legality of the Zimbabwean government’s controversial decision 
to not provide compensation to owners, and concluding that such a decision 
violates international standards). 
 30. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16B(3)(a), (4) (“A person having any right or interest in the land shall not apply to 
a court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the State, and no court shall 
entertain any such challenge . . . . As soon as practicable . . . the person responsible 
under any law providing for the registration of title over land shall, without further 
notice, effect the necessary endorsements upon any title deed . . . for the purpose of 
formally cancelling the title deed and registering in the State title over the land."); 
see also ISAAC MAPOSA, CATHOLIC COMM’N FOR JUSTICE & PEACE IN ZIM., LAND 
REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 73-74 (1995) (interpreting the Land Acquisition Act, the 
implementing legislation for Amendments 16A and 16B, to also deny individuals 
access to the court to contest land designation, acquisition, or fairness of the 
amount of compensation for improvements). 
 31. See Alex Bell, Zimbabwe: Farmers Slam Fresh Onslaught of Land-Grab 
Violence, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 28, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010 
290064.html (reporting that landowners have been assaulted, severely beaten, 
killed, and forced to leave their homes by gangs, without any prior notice). Many 
of the so-called “war veterans” involved in these land invasions were likely thugs 
hired by or implicitly supported by the government.  Peter Godwin, Ulterior 
Motives: Mugabe prizes political dominance over peace and prosperity, TIME 
(World), May 1, 2000, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,205043 
2,00.html. 
 32. See Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter] (protecting property, but allowing acquisitions 
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private property interests as robustly as other human rights, such as 
the prohibition against torture or arbitrary detentions.33 The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural  Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, two major 
human rights treaties, do not even explicitly refer to property rights.34 
Because property rights involve a delicate balance between 
individual rights and national welfare, international law shies away 
from absolute property rights and instead balances the need to protect 
individual rights with national interests.35  
 
in the public interest that conform to domestic laws); see also Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] 
(including a provision that requires just compensation, but allowing states to 
subordinate property rights with domestic legislation); Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol I, art. 1, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR, Protocol I] (granting the right to 
property, limited by domestic laws that are in accordance with general principles 
of international law); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, art. 17(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] 
(failing to  require compensation for compulsory property acquisitions); see also 
Pedro Nikken, Balancing of Human Rights and Investment Law in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 246, 247 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 
2009) (assessing that the development of human rights law as a result of gruesome 
and repressive government regimes has made protection of property rights seem 
less imperative). 
 33. See Margaroli v. Argentina, Case 11.400, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 5/09, ¶ 87 (2009), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/argentina 
11400eng.htm#_ftn1 (absolving itself of responsibility to decide if a domestic 
court’s compensation has been just); cf. John McClung Nading, Comment, 
Property Under Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 737, 786 (2002) (citing scholars who claim that private property 
ownership is a second-tier human right when compared to rights to life, liberty, or 
security).  See generally Afr. Inst. for Human Rights & Dev. v. Guinea, 2004 Afr. 
Hum. Rts. L. Rep. 57 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2004) (finding 
a violation of the right to property only when in conjunction with facts involving 
torture, assault, rape, and physical property destruction). 
 34. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (failing to mention individual 
property rights); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (declining to protect the right to 
property).  But cf. Bronwen Manby, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 14 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, no. 1, 2002 at 37 (stating that interpretations of the ICCPR 
clarify that the Convention’s anti-discrimination clause does protect the right to 
property, even though it is not explicitly stated). 
 35. See Nading, supra note 33, at 776-78 (finding that developing nations often 
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The UDHR and the Banjul Charter, both of which Zimbabwe has 
signed,36 specifically address property rights in Articles 17 and 14, 
respectively.37 Both of these documents are important because they 
inform States of minimum international human rights standards to 
which they are obliged to adhere to domestically.38  
Article 17 of the UDHR guarantees individuals the right to own 
property and not to have it arbitrarily deprived.39 Article 8 of the 
UDHR further guarantees that when fundamental rights are violated, 
individuals have a right to an effective remedy by a court or 
tribunal.40 Article 14 of the Banjul Charter also guarantees the right 
to property, although it allows the government to take property for 
the public good in conformity with appropriate laws.41 Like the 
UDHR, Article 17 of the Banjul Charter also gives all individuals 
the right to due process and to have claims heard before an 
independent court.42  Together, these provisions provide the basis for 
property protection for landowners in Zimbabwe. 
 
lean towards expropriations to improve the national welfare, while developed 
countries value individual rights more strongly). 
 36. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1787 (listing relevant treaties 
Zimbabwe has signed that affect Zimbabwe’s obligations in its land reform laws). 
 37. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(1)-(2) (protecting the right to property 
and prohibiting arbitrary takings); see also Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14 
(protecting property, limited by takings in the public interest). 
 38. Cf. Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27 
AKRON L. REV. 281, 283-84 (1994) (claiming that no responsible world leader 
would disclaim that the UDHR guarantees  minimum protections that are binding 
on all nations). 
 39. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(1)-(2) (“1) Everyone has the right to own 
property alone as well as in association with others. 2) No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property.”); see also Sean Romero, Note, Mass Forced Evictions 
and the Human Right to Adequate Housing in Zimbabwe, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 275, 291 (2007) (arguing that the UDHR’s prohibition on arbitrary takings 
has a jus cogens character in international law). 
 40. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”). 
 41. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14 (“The right to property shall be 
guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate laws.”). 
 42. See id. art. 7(1) (“Every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard.”). 
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C. TENSION BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWEAN JUDICIARY AND THE 
SADC TRIBUNAL REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF AMENDMENTS 
16A AND 16B 
In 2007, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court issued its decision on 
the constitutionality of Amendments 16A and 16B in Campbell v. 
Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform, 
and Resettlement.43 It held that land reform is a non-justiciable 
political question, and that the Constitution could legally deny a right 
to access courts to challenge land acquisitions.44 Contrastingly, while 
the decision in the Supreme Court was still pending, the SADC 
Tribunal held, in Campbell v. Republic of Zimbabwe, that 
Amendments 16A and 16B violate international law because they are 
discriminatory and deny individuals the fundamental right to access 
courts and have their grievance heard.45  
Under its founding treaty, the SADC Tribunal has jurisdiction to 
hear cases involving individual human rights and the rule of law.46 
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has accepted the SADC Tribunal’s 
validity and has accepted that it should adhere to the Tribunal’s 
decisions, except in matters where the decision would contradict 
public policy.47 The SADC Tribunal began operating in 2007, and 
Campbell was its first case.48 Because the Tribunal is so new, the 
 
 43. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 28 (Zim.) 
(deciding that Campbell’s rights had not been violated by the promulgation of 
Amendments 16A and 16B, and that he had no right to a remedy). 
 44. See id. (arguing that the protections a person receives under the 
Constitution for their private property has a political and legislative character, 
which is beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction). 
 45. See Campbell Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. 
Trib. 2008) (holding that all applicants have been denied access to Zimbabwean 
courts and subjected to racial discrimination). 
 46. See Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 4, Aug. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116, 126 [hereinafter SADC Treaty] (“SADC and its Member 
States shall act in accordance with the following principles . . . human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law.”). 
 47. See David Hemel & Andrew Schalkwyk, Tyranny on Trial: Regional 
Courts Crack Down on Mugabe’s Land “Reform”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 518 
(2010) (remarking that Zimbabwe has indicated that it would be against public 
policy to register a regional court decision that would contradict a domestic 
decision). 
 48. See id. at 517 (noting that in deciding Campbell Ltd. v. Zim., Case No. 
2/2007 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2008), the Tribunal established itself as a forum 
to provide relief for human rights violations). 
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scope and impact it will have on Southern Africa is still unclear.49 
However, if it continues to issue strong human rights decisions as it 
did in Campbell, the Tribunal’s breadth may be wider than originally 
envisioned.50 
The Zimbabwe High Court considered the SADC Tribunal’s 
decision in Gramara v. Republic of Zimbabwe.51 The Court accepted 
that a state cannot invoke its own domestic deficiencies to evade 
international obligations and that it must make a good faith effort to 
conform to treaty obligations.52 It also recognized that Zimbabweans 
and the international community have a legitimate expectation that 
Zimbabwe will adhere to SADC Tribunal decisions and enforce its 
judgments.53 However, when balancing these concerns against 
Zimbabwe’s public policy on land reform and Zimbabweans’ 
legitimate expectations that Zimbabwe would follow its own 
Constitution, Gramara held that the SADC Tribunal decision was 
contrary to public policy and unenforceable domestically.54 
II. ANALYSIS 
Failure to conform land reform laws to minimum international 
obligations has stark and often tragic consequences on landless black 
Zimbabweans, landowners, and other stakeholders who suffer most 
 
 49. See id. at 521 (hypothesizing that the Tribunal’s growing docket indicates 
that it could become a major factor in enforcing human rights in Southern Africa, 
although realizing that practical difficulties enforcing the judgments cast some 
doubts on how effective it can be). 
 50. See id. at 517 (noting that while the SADC was rather stagnant for the first 
decade of its operation, the Tribunal, operational since 2007, has been incredibly 
proactive especially in respect to human rights). 
 51. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, ¶ 5 (High Ct. Zim.) 
(analyzing the effect of the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Zimbabwe’s domestic 
courts). 
 52. See id. (noting that the international law tenant is obligated to perform all 
treaties in good faith, regardless of any domesticating legislation). 
 53. See id. at 13 (agreeing that by signing the Treaty and submitting to the 
SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction, Zimbabwe has created an enforceable expectation 
that it will follow the SADC Tribunal’s decisions). 
 54. See id. at 16 (arguing that far more Zimbabweans have a legitimate 
expectation that Zimbabwe will follow its own laws and Constitution than those 
that expect it to adhere to SADC Tribunal decisions). Since the SADC Tribunal 
decision made it impossible to meet both of these expectations, the Court declined 
to register the judgment. Id. 
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directly.55 Not only is fast-track land reform harmful, it fails to meet 
the standards in Articles 8 and 17(2) of the UDHR and Articles 7(1) 
and 14 of the Banjul Charter because it is arbitrary, violates due 
process of law, and denies compensation to landowners.56 By 
refusing to repeal Amendments 16A and 16B, and by not adhering to 
the SADC Tribunal decision in Campbell, Zimbabwe is in breach of 
its obligations under international law.57 
A. AMENDMENTS 16A AND 16B VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
AND THE PROHIBITION ON ARBITRARY TAKINGS. 
Zimbabwe’s current law provides governmental agencies with 
broad discretion to take land, leading to arbitrary takings based on 
racial criteria.58 By allowing arbitrary takings, Zimbabwe violates the 
right to property guaranteed in Article 14 of the Banjul Charter and 
 
 55. See, e.g., Nading, supra note 35, at 751-53 (tracking the economic decline 
of Zimbabwe under the fast-track land reform program, from one of the most 
prosperous nations in Africa to a nation facing an economic and social crisis where 
half the population is threatened with starvation); see also MICHAEL LIPTON, LAND 
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY WRONGS 
55 (2009) (claiming that fast-track reform has not reduced beneficiaries’ reliance 
on food purchases and has caused laborers to lose their jobs, livelihood, and access 
to social services). 
 56. See UDHR, supra note 32, arts. 8, 17; Banjul Charter, supra note 32, arts. 
7(1), 14 (protecting the right to property, preventing arbitrary deprivations, and 
requiring due process for individuals); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing 
Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search 
for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 591, 592 (1998) (asserting that all 
individuals should be protected under the law and have the right to justice if their 
human rights have been violated). 
 57. E.g., Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1786 (concluding that “the fast-
track resettlement program is illegal, unconstitutional, and a violation of human 
rights standard[s] . . . .”); see also CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 
5 of 2005), arts. 16A-16B (not including proper safeguards against arbitrary 
takings); Campbell Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007, 57 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. 
Trib. 2008) (finding that Amendments 16A and 16B have led to arbitrary racial 
discrimination). 
 58. See MAPOSA, supra note 30, at 74, 76 (criticizing the Act for the discretion 
it leaves for implementing authorities and raising the issue that it does not prohibit 
officials from targeting land for racial or other impermissible reasons); see also 
MACGARRY, supra note 24, at 18 (pointing to instances where land was acquired 
to punish political opposition or as an alternative to prosecution in court).  See 
generally Land Acquisition Act, supra note 24 (failing to provide clear, 
measurable criterion to government officials acquiring land to prevent takings 
based on unlawful motivations). 
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the prohibition on non-arbitrary takings in Article 17(2) of the 
UDHR.59 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court has disregarded its 
domestic laws and international law by not striking down 
Amendment 16A and 16B.60  
1. Amendments 16A and 16B violate Article 17(2) of the UDHR and 
Article 14 of the Banjul Charter because they are arbitrary. 
Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform gives an impermissible amount 
of discretion to the government to expropriate property, which has 
led to racially-based land reform, in violation of Article 17 of the 
UDHR and Article 14 of the Banjul Charter.61 
The UDHR specifically guarantees that property must not be taken 
arbitrarily.62 Although the UDHR does not define the term arbitrary, 
it is often measured by the amount of procedural safeguards the law 
provides, or by how the law impacts certain classes when it is 
applied.63  
Unlike the UDHR, the Banjul Charter does not specifically refer 
 
 59. Compare Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14, and UDHR, supra note 32, 
art. 17(1)-(2) (guaranteeing property rights to individuals, with a prohibition on 
arbitrary takings), with CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 
2005), art. 16B (refusing to adopt criteria that would prevent racial applications of 
its land expropriation authorization). 
 60. See Campbell Ltd. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 13 (Zim.) 
(declining to decide whether the law is racially discriminatory); cf. Andy Mielnik, 
Comment, Hugo Chavez: Venezuela’s New Bandito or Zorro?, 14 L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 591, 603 (2008) (finding that Zimbabwe’s current land reform program is far 
from meeting international or domestic standards and can be considered a 
“tyrannical land reform regime”). 
 61. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 16B 
(allowing expropriations without naming specific guidelines to target property); 
Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14; UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2). This 
protection is also considered incorporated into customary international law.  See 
Re, supra note 38, at 284 (noting that the UDHR standards contain the minimum, 
not maximum, protections that a state must guarantee individuals). 
 62. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2). 
 63. See, e.g., ELETTRONICA SICULA S.P.A. (U.S. V. IT.), JUDGMENT, 1989 I.C.J. 
15, 76 (July 20) (defining arbitrariness as contrary to the rule of law to the level of 
shocking a sense of judicial propriety); Shriver, supra note 21, at 438-47 (arguing 
that Namibia’s land law that allows expropriations in the public interest is too 
expansive to prevent arbitrary application because it allows the government to 
single out white farm owners who have fired black workers). 
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to arbitrary takings in its clause on property protections.64 It also 
qualifies its protection of private property by allowing takings in the 
“general interest of the community” according to “appropriate 
laws.”65 The broadness of this clause has led some to believe that the 
Banjul Charter gives states practically unbridled discretion to take 
property as long as it is supported by any law, presumably including 
Amendments 16A and 16B.66 This argument is problematic because 
while land redistribution is certainly in Zimbabwe’s “general 
interest,”67 an arbitrary law is not an “appropriate law” within the 
meaning of the Banjul Charter, especially when applying basic treaty 
interpretation principles.68 Because the African Commission has not 
considered a case similar to the facts of this case, the only means to 
analyze Article 14 of the Banjul Charter is through a treaty 
 
 64. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14 (guaranteeing the right to 
property, but qualified by public interest takings). 
 65. Id.  But cf. EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 142 (1996) (admitting that 
although the Banjul Charter is supposed to bind signatory African nations, there is 
evidence that some seize property without due process). 
 66. See Shirley, supra note 20, at 168 (criticizing the Banjul Charter for the 
discretion it gives states to acquire land, undermining its force as a human rights 
document); see also Romero, supra note 39, at 288 (wondering whether the Banjul 
Charter adequately protects property since it does not define the term property or 
prohibit forced evictions and gives states discretion in implementing national 
laws).  But see Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The 
African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 679, 688-89 (2004) (clarifying that while 
those unfamiliar with the African Commission may believe the Banjul Charter 
subordinates its principles to domestic laws, the Commission has stipulated that 
national laws may only limit rights if those limitations are in accordance with 
international human rights principles). 
 67. Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14.  Especially for post-colonial states 
with highly unequal land distribution, land reform is an important and worthy goal, 
as long as it is accomplished without violating others’ human rights.  Cf. Rahman 
Ford, Comment, Law, History, and the Colonial Discourse: Davies v. 
Commissioner and Zimbabwe as a Colonialist Case Study, 45 HOW. L. J. 213, 244 
(2001) (reviewing the suffering of black Zimbabweans under colonialism and their 
right to have access to land ownership). 
 68. See Vincent O. Nmehielle, Development of the African Human Rights 
System in the Last Decade, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 1, 2008 at 6-7 (explaining that 
despite the existence of “claw-back” provisions in the ACPHR that seem to 
subordinate its guarantees to domestic law, the African Commission has 
interpreted the Banjul Charter to provide individuals with robust protection). The 
Commission has confirmed that international human rights laws are overarching 
principles that may not be limited by domestic interference. See id. (reiterating that 
the Banjul Charter does not have a derogation clause). 
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interpretation.69 
The Vienna Convention requires all treaties to be interpreted in 
good faith, according to their ordinary meaning, while also 
considering their object and purpose.70 The Convention also 
presumes that states negotiate treaties within the context of their 
international obligations; therefore, a good faith interpretation 
requires the interpreter to assume that the treaty was written with the 
intent that states would apply it in accordance with internationally 
accepted principles.71   
Applying the Vienna Convention’s dictates on treaty interpretation 
to Article 14 of the Banjul Charter, it is clear that the Charter is not 
meant to provide states with flexibility to arbitrarily take land. As a 
human rights treaty, it is unreasonable to interpret the Banjul Charter 
in a way that legitimizes arbitrary takings or refuses to protect 
property owners who are targeted based on their race.72 In addition, 
using the Vienna Convention’s requirement to consider the ordinary 
meaning of the treaty language, Article 14 of the Banjul Charter only 
allows taking in the “general interest of the community.”73 It is not in 
 
 69. See VINCENT O. NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS 
LAWS, PRACTICE, AND INSTITUTIONS 120 (2001) [hereinafter NMEHIELLE, HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM] (admitting that there is little case law published by the African 
Commission to accurately determine the scope that Article 14 is intended to 
cover). 
 70. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 
U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 448 (2004) (reviewing human 
rights bodies to conclude that international tribunals refuse to accept subjective or 
unusual treaty interpretations, avoid treaty interpretations that derogate from 
internationally accepted standards, and only look to sources beyond the treaty text 
when it is particularly ambiguous or confusing). 
 72. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: 
Revisiting States’ Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 105, 110 (2004) (describing the purpose of the Banjul Charter as an 
assertion of universal human rights principles designed to be binding on all African 
nations, particularly principles of freedom, dignity, justice, and non-
discrimination). 
 73. See Vienna Convention, supra note 70, art. 31(1); Banjul Charter, supra 
note 32, art. 14; see also Criddle, supra note 71, at 446-47 (explaining that 
ordinary meaning refers to a strict textual interpretation whenever possible). 
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any state or any community’s interest to violate its citizens’ basic 
human rights, as Amendments 16A and 16B do by allowing arbitrary 
application and racial discrimination.74 Although President Mugabe 
has argued that these takings are a rational method to redress 
unlawful colonial dispossessions, post-colonial practice requires 
states to respect owners who have current titles to land in order to 
protect the rule of law.75 As Zimbabwe has proven, fast-track land 
reform degrades the rule of law and breeds violence, contrary to the 
general interest of its citizens. 
Additionally, it is incorrect to assume the Banjul Charter is meant 
to encompass any law within “appropriate law;” instead, appropriate 
laws are only those which conform to internationally accepted 
principles of non-arbitrariness and non-discrimination.76 This 
interpretation also aligns with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties’ direction that interpreters should assume that treaties intend 
to follow international precepts, which include prohibitions on 
arbitrary laws and racial discrimination.77 While the African 
Commission has not satisfactorily interpreted Article 14, in other 
instances it has relied on outside treaties and international 
documents, particularly the UDHR, to inform its own analysis.78 In 
 
 74. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8 (requiring states to provide a remedy to 
victims of any human rights violations perpetrated by the state); see also Joyner, 
supra note 56, at 592 (noting that when a state allows human rights violations, it 
becomes obligated to provide a remedy). 
 75. See THEO R. G. VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY 283 
(2002) (explaining that with the possible rare exception of a party that was directly 
responsible for acquiring the land unjustifiably, the state must follow due process 
principles and execute land takings through a fair process using an independent 
tribunal). 
 76. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); see International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
[hereinafter ICERD] (declaring that all human beings are equal before the law and 
are entitled to equal treatment, and condemning all forms of racial discrimination). 
 77. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); ICERD, supra note 76; see also Criddle, 
supra note 71, at 448 (finding that according to the Vienna Convention, states 
should interpret treaties in a manner that recognizes the preeminence of 
international law). 
 78. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, arts. 60-61 (indicating that it is 
appropriate to use outside treaties and general principles of law as a subsidiary 
means to determine a state’s human rights obligations, and specifically mentioning 
the UDHR as a document that the Commission should consider when applying the 
Banjul Charter’s mandates); see also NMEHIELLE, HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, supra 
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these instances, the Commission has found that supposed “claw-
back” provisions, that seem to subordinate international law to 
domestic provisions, may not be utilized to allow a state to derogate 
from internationally-accepted principles.79 Instead, it has interpreted 
the Banjul Charter in ways that closely align with other human rights 
documents and has given states very little discretion to limit rights 
under their domestic laws.80 Therefore, an analysis of the ordinary 
meaning of the Charter and a consideration of the liberal manner in 
which the Commission has interpreted provisions that limit rights to 
domestic laws reveal that the Charter’s protection of property does 
encompass internationally accepted principles that prohibit arbitrary 
or racially-based property deprivation.81 
Zimbabwe’s land reform law is arbitrary under Article 17 of the 
UDHR and not appropriate under Article 14 of the Banjul Charter 
because it does not provide any objective criteria to guide land 
expropriations, which allows it to be easily abused and racially 
discriminatory.82 In addition to not providing any criteria to guide 
expropriations, it does not define basic terms to provide guidance to 
implementing authorities to even know which land should be 
acquired and who is eligible for redistribution.83 In implementing 
 
note 69, at 159 (considering that Articles 60 to 61 of the Banjul Charter may give 
the Commission expansive power to extend the reach of the Charter to encompass 
the same protections as other regional and universal human rights documents). 
 79. See Heyns, supra note 66, at 689 (praising the Commission for prohibiting 
states from departing from internationally-accepted standards, even in respect to 
provisions in the Banjul Charter that contain clauses that seemingly subordinate 
their protection to domestic law). 
 80. See id. at 689-90 (looking to decisions of the Commission to confirm it 
does not provide States with discretion to limit the rights articulated in the Banjul 
Charter, regardless of whether there is a limiting clause). 
 81. See Vienna Convention, supra note 70, at 31(1) (stating that a treaty should 
be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning).  But cf. Banjul Charter, supra 
note 32, art. 14 (allowing arbitrary takings as long as it is in the interest of the 
public under the ordinary language of Article 14). 
 82. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14; see 
ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED 
IN THE WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 329 (1994) (noting that various 
international tribunals have held that discriminatory expropriations are always 
illegal). 
 83. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1794 (noting that the law targets 
underutilized farms without defining underutilized farm and names the landless as 
beneficiaries without providing guidelines to determine which people are landless). 
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Amendments 16A and 16B to redistribute land, Zimbabwe has 
discriminated against white landowners by targeting only white-
owned land for redistribution and attempting to eradicate white-
owned farms in Zimbabwe.84 Additionally, Zimbabwe has not 
adopted any fair criteria, such as proper use of land, Zimbabwean 
citizenship, or other relevant factors to decide which lands to 
expropriate.85 Refusing to adopt fair measuring criteria invites abuse 
and de facto racial discrimination.86  
Not only does fast-track land reform discriminate against white 
farmers based on disproportionate impact, it also intentionally targets 
white farmers.87 Ample evidence demonstrates that Amendments 
16A and 16B were passed because of hostility towards white farmers 
and to ease the government’s ability to redistribute land on racial 
terms.88 Before introducing Amendments 16A and 16B, President 
 
 84. See, e.g., Amy Ochoa Carson, Note, East Timor’s Land Tenure Problems: 
A Consideration of Land Reform Programs in Zimbabwe and South Africa, 17 IND. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 395, 421 (2007) (asserting that Zimbabwe’s program may 
have been conducted to “punish whites”); see also Paul Mysliwiec, Comment, 
Accomplice to Genocide Liability: The Case for a Purpose Mens Rea Standard, 10 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 389, 398-99 (2009) (suggesting that Mugabe garnered support for 
land redistribution by vilifying whites). 
 85. See Campbell Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007, 53 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. 
Trib. 2008) (noting that criteria for redistribution are “not reasonable and objective 
but arbitrary and based primarily on considerations of race”); see also MAPOSA, 
supra note 30, at 73 (considering it particularly concerning that while many land 
reform programs only compulsorily acquire underutilized land, Zimbabwe’s law 
allows even economically productive land to be targeted for redistribution). 
 86. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 52 (explaining that when a law 
affects only white farmers, it is indirectly, or de facto discriminatory). 
 87. See ICERD, supra note 76, art. 1 (outlawing distinctions that “ha[ve] the 
purpose or effect” of discriminating against persons based on race); see also U.N. 
Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 198, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter HRC Comment] (defining 
discrimination as laws that have the “purpose or effect” of putting persons of 
certain races on an unequal footing as others in General Comment No. 18). 
 88. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1794 (stating that Zanu-PF, 
Zimbabwe’s ruling party, labels all whites as unsupportive of Zanu-PF’s rule and 
believes that human rights regarding land should not apply to them); see also 
BRIAN RAFTOPOULOS, THE POLITICS OF THE MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, 
New Zimbabwe (NOV. 12, 2009), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/ 
opinion140.14149.html (reviewing an ad before a referendum to amend the land 
reform law that pictured an elderly white couple, and the caption “Are you going 
to allow them to continue to tell you what to do?”). 
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Mugabe even called white farmers “enemies of the state.”89 This 
attitude towards white farmers shows a racially discriminatory intent, 
while the lack of clear guidance towards applying the law allows it to 
be applied to disproportionately affect white landowners.90  Together, 
these deficiencies constitute violations of the UDHR and the Banjul 
Charter’s protection of property and prohibition on arbitrary takings, 
which includes racially-based takings.91 
2. The Zimbabwe Supreme Court erred by not following its 
Declaration of Rights, the SADC Tribunal decision, or South African 
persuasive precedent in Campbell.  
When the Zimbabwe Supreme Court considered Campbell, it had 
the opportunity to enjoin land redistribution until objective criteria 
were formed, invalidate Amendments 16A and 16B completely, or 
provide damages to the white farm owners who claimed their land 
was targeted because of their race.92 Instead, it ignored the possibility 
that fast-track land reform could be implicitly discriminatory, and 
instead decided, ipse dixit, that because the Amendments did not 
reference race explicitly, they were not racially discriminatory.93  
This decision was incorrect as a matter of Zimbabwe’s domestic 
law and international law.94 Zimbabwe’s Declaration of Rights 
 
 89. Boyle, supra note 15, at 684. See id. at 685 (relating that Mugabe argued 
that war veterans have attacked white farmers because of their frustrations at white 
farmers for behaving as enemies of Zimbabwe, and that following these 
inflammatory speeches, thirty-one people were killed in farm invasions in an one-
month period). 
 90. See Mysliwiec, supra note 84, at 398 (providing evidence that almost all 
white-owned farms were seized under “fast-track” land reform); see also VAN 
BANNING, supra note 75, at 333 (asserting that the only criteria the government 
used when applying the land reform law was race-based criteria). 
 91. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14. 
 92. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 1-2 
(reviewing the claims made by the Petitioners); see also  Hemel & Schalkwyk, 
supra note 47, at 519 (noting that the Supreme Court passed on its opportunity to 
invalidate Amendments 16A and 16B based on the idea that Zimbabwe’s 
Constitution has core features that cannot be overridden by constitutional 
amendments). 
 93. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 13 (failing to analyze Zimbabwe’s 
non-discrimination clause and ignoring the portion of the non-discrimination 
clause that denounces racial discrimination). 
 94. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), arts.  
16(1)(a), 23 (restricting expropriations to those that can be shown to be reasonably 
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ensures that property may only be acquired under authority of law 
and that individuals have a right not to be treated in a racially 
discriminatory manner.95 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court 
incorrectly found that a law that does not reference race cannot 
trigger the anti-discrimination clause in section 23 of its 
Constitution.96 In making this decision, the Court ignored the portion 
of the anti-discrimination clause that expressly prohibits 
discriminatory treatment in effect.97 Amendments 16A and 16B are 
intended to, and have led to different treatment based on race, 
making them racially discriminatory and in violation of Zimbabwe’s 
anti-discrimination clause.98 
In addition to ignoring domestic legal tenants, the Supreme Court 
ignored its obligations in the international realm by not adhering to 
the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Campbell.99 Upon consideration of 
 
necessary by the government and prohibiting discrimination on racial grounds); see 
also SADC Treaty, supra note 46, art. 4 (obligating states’ parties to adhere the 
protection of to individuals’ human rights). 
 95. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), arts. 
16(1)(a), 23 (restricting expropriations to those that can be shown to be reasonably 
necessary by the government and prohibiting discrimination on racial grounds); see 
also Nading, supra note 35, at 772-74 (noting that the protection of property is 
mentioned twice in the Declaration of Rights, and that Amendment 16A is in direct 
contradiction of these protections of property from arbitrary deprivation). 
 96. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 23 
(invalidating laws that are discriminatory on their face or in effect); see also 
Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07, at 13 (finding that although the Declaration of 
Rights prohibits discrimination in fact or in effect that Amendments 16A and 16B 
are not racially discriminatory because they do not explicitly mention race). 
 97. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 23 
(specifying that a law can still be discriminatory if it does not mention race but is 
discriminatory in effect). 
 98. See id. (providing protection from race-based discrimination); cf. Gabriel 
Shumba, International Standards and the 2002 Presidential Election in Zimbabwe, 
10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95, 115 (2003) (claiming that when Zimbabwe’s 
government failed to pass a constitutional overhaul through a referendum that 
included land reform measures, it launched a racist campaign against white 
farmers).  But cf. Boyle, supra note 15, at 684 (recounting a speech in which 
President Mugabe blamed white farmers for the land crisis in Zimbabwe and 
justified violent attacks on their land). 
 99. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.) 
(refusing to adhere to the SADC Tribunal decision domestically); cf. Hemel & 
Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 521 (finding that despite any obligation to register 
the judgment, it is difficult to enforce judgments domestically when the political 
will is absent). 
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the same facts as the Supreme Court, the SADC Tribunal applied 
international principles to find that Amendments 16A and 16B 
arbitrarily targeted land in a racially discriminatory way.100 It noted 
that if a law is either passed with a discriminatory intent or if it 
disproportionally impacts one race, the law violates anti-
discrimination standards.101 The SADC Tribunal accepted 
Campbell’s argument that the Zimbabwean government planned to 
eradicate white land ownership in Zimbabwe, and passed 
Amendments 16A and 16B to accomplish this goal more quickly and 
with fewer obstacles from courts.102 As such, the Tribunal correctly 
concluded that Amendments 16A and 16B constitute indirect 
discrimination.103 By refusing to adopt the SADC Tribunal’s 
reasoning, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe is in violation of its 
international obligations.104 
Lastly, while South African law is not controlling, Zimbabwe 
courts regularly look to South African courts for guidance.105 South 
 
 100. See Campbell Ltd.v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007, 52 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. 
Trib. 2008) (refusing to accept an argument that a law is not discriminatory 
because it does not mention race on its face). 
 101. See id. at 45 (asserting that discrimination in any form or nature is 
prohibited in international law, and corroborating its claim by citing to general 
comments from the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (citation omitted)); see also MAPOSA, supra note 30, at 
89 (calling it “quite disturbing” for the government to have so much discretion in 
implementing land reform, a politically-charged issue where independent oversight 
is particularly important to prevent racially discriminatory practices). 
 102. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 42 (citing the Petitioner’s brief 
which accused the Government of Zimbabwe of using Amendments 16A and 16B 
to systematically expropriate white-owned farms). 
 103. See id. at 50 (quoting the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (citation omitted) who defined indirect discrimination as “a law . . . [that] 
does not appear to be discriminatory but has a discriminatory effect when 
implemented”). 
 104. See SADC Treaty, supra note 46, art. 16(5) (granting the Tribunal with the 
power to make binding decisions); see also SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY, PROTOCOL ON TRIBUNAL AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THEREOF 
pt. III, art. 32(3) (2000), available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/163 
[hereinafter SADC PROTOCOL ON THE TRIBUNAL] (determining that all Tribunal 
decisions are to be enforced in the State implicated by the SADC Tribunal’s 
decision). 
 105. Cf. Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 6 (High Ct. Zim.) 
(referring to English and South African law to add to the persuasiveness of its 
analysis and establish common practice among States); Romero, supra note 39, at 
292  (stating that particularly for the Declaration of Rights, which encompasses 
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African precedent is especially persuasive on land reform issues, as 
the colonial history that led to unequal distribution of land in South 
Africa is quite similar to that of Zimbabwe.106 Unlike Zimbabwe’s 
Supreme Court, the South African court has held that arbitrary 
takings based on race, or without objective criteria, are illegal, and as 
such, it has registered the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Campbell.107 
This persuasive analysis, in addition to Zimbabwe’s obligation to 
adhere to its Declaration of Rights and the SADC Tribunal, reveal 
that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court wrongly decided Campbell 
under domestic and international law.108 
B. AMENDMENTS 16A AND 16B VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
STANDARDS. 
In addition to arbitrarily targeting white landowners, Amendments 
16A and 16B deny landowners proper notice and a judicial forum to 
challenge land seizures, in violation of Article 8 of the UDHR and 
Article 7(1)(a) of the Banjul Charter.109 In Campbell, the 
 
Amendments 16A and 16B, Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court often refers to other 
Commonwealth courts, including South Africa’s courts). 
 106. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 15, at 694 (comparing the similar obstacles that 
South Africa and Zimbabwe face such as overcoming unequal land distribution, 
poverty, and insecurity caused by colonial dispossession); see also Michael Garcia 
Bochenek, Compensation for Human Rights Abuses in Zimbabwe, 26 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 483, 496 (1995) (recounting that Zimbabwe’s common law 
system is based on South Africa’s, and that it relies heavily on South African law 
and other Commonwealth courts for persuasive analysis). 
 107. See Fick v. Zim., Case No. 01/2010, 2, 4 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2010), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2010/8.pdf (recognizing that 
Zimbabwe is in violation of the SADC Tribunal and taking steps to enforce the 
judgment in South Africa); see also Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 521 
(referring to the single paragraph judgment in which the Court calculated 
approximately US$15,5000 in damages for the plaintiffs in Campbell (citation 
omitted)). The High Court also attached Zimbabwean government assets in South 
Africa to pay the damages. Id. at 521. 
 108. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 16(1) 
(protecting an individual’s right to property, with which the Legislature must 
comply when creating laws); see also Fick v. Zim., Case No. 01/2010, 4 (S. Afr. 
Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2010) (noting that Zimbabwe has taken no steps to comply with 
the SADC Tribunal’s judgment). 
 109. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16B(3)(a) (denying landowners the ability to challenge acquisitions in court); see 
also UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8 (guaranteeing the right to an effective remedy in 
a tribunal for violations of individual rights); Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 
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Zimbabwean Supreme Court incorrectly applied domestic law and 
has refused to register the SADC Tribunal judgment that found that 
Amendments 16A and 16B do not provide due process.110 
1. Amendments 16A and 16B violate the due process guarantees in 
Article 8 of the UDHR and Article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter. 
Under Amendments 16A and 16B, landowners are able to 
judicially challenge the amount of compensation for a taking, but 
may not challenge the acquisition itself.111 This restriction violates 
the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the UDHR and 7(1) of the Banjul 
Charter that protect an individual’s right to have an impartial hearing 
by an independent tribunal to have his or her grievance heard.112 The 
right to have a fair hearing for grievances is a well-accepted right 
across jurisdictions, nations, and cultures.113 Unlike the prohibition 
on arbitrary property takings, the right to due process in the UDHR 
and the Banjul Charter is not qualified by any other concerns and is 
protected under all circumstances.114  
 
7(1)(a) (giving individuals the right to have their cause heard, and to appeal 
violations of their fundamental rights in a court); MANBY, supra note 34, at 40 
(arguing that Zimbabwe is in violation of fundamental human rights laws by 
implementing a policy that is not transparent and denies individuals the right to 
appeal decisions). 
 110. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 21 (Zim.) 
(limiting its analysis to whether the Legislature complied with procedural 
requirements in enacting art. 16B, instead of whether the law denies mandatory 
due process rights); see also Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 
(High Ct. Zim.) (finding that it would be contrary to public policy to register the 
SADC Tribunal’s judgment). 
 111. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16B(3)(a) (denying a judicial remedy for the government’s decision to acquire 
land); see also Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1792 (finding that even the 
ability to appeal compensation is limited to instances where the court finds that the 
Compensation Committee did not act in accordance with lawful principles). 
 112. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8; Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 7(1)(a) 
(establishing that every individual has a right to be heard by a competent tribunal); 
see also Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1790 (observing that The Land 
Acquisition Act, the implementing law for Amendments 16A and 16B, only allows 
appeals on compensation and not on the designation of the land for acquisition, 
which falls short of legal due process standards). 
 113. See, e.g., Shriver, supra note 21, at 445 (asserting that the proposition that 
due process is mandatory has broad global support). 
 114. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 7(1) (protecting the right of an 
individual to have his or her cause heard under all circumstances); see also UDHR, 
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Since there is no tribunal that directly interprets the UDHR, its 
requirements are best understood through other human rights 
tribunals that have looked to the UDHR for analysis.115 The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has a provision 
similar to the UDHR guaranteeing access to court.116 When 
interpreting Article 6(1), the European Court has referred to the 
UDHR to enlighten its analysis, and has found that every individual 
has a fundamental right to access the court in civil matters before an 
independent tribunal, and that a state has breached its obligations 
when it fails to provide this access.117 This interpretation is consistent 
with the argument that Campbell’s right to access the court under the 
UHDR was violated by Zimbabwe because Amendment 16B took 
away his ability to challenge the taking of his property in a court.118 
The African Commission can issue recommendations and resolve 
disputes arising under the Banjul Charter.119 The Commission has 
interpreted Article 7(1) on numerous occasions and has held that any 
law that takes away the jurisdiction of the court in certain instances is 
invalid.120 The Commission has recommended that laws that remove 
 
supra note 32, art. 8 (granting every person the right to a remedy for a violation of 
that person’s rights). 
 115. Cf. Joyner, supra note 56, at 591 (emphasizing that the UDHR was not 
created to be a document that is directly enforceable, but its contents are still 
binding on all nations). 
 116. See ECHR, Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 6(1) (stating that “[E]veryone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.”). 
 117. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 524, ¶¶ 34-36 (1975) 
(relying on the UDHR and Vienna Convention to interpret the ECHR to find that 
the right to access the court to bring a civil action is included in Article 6(1)). 
 118. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16B(3)(a); UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8. 
 119. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 45(1)(b), 3  (granting the 
Commission the authority to create principles and legal rules and to interpret the 
provisions of the Charter to determine violations). 
 120. See, e.g., Purohit v. Gam., Commc’n No. 241/2001, ¶¶ 8, 70-72 (Afr. 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003) (deciding that the Lunatics 
Detention Act, which prohibits those detained for mental health reasons from 
obtaining legal resources or suing for damages for violations of their rights, is 
illegal under Article 7(1)); Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v. Rwanda, 
Commc’n Nos. 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, ¶ 34 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1996) (holding that expelling refugees from Rwanda, without 
providing them the opportunity to be heard, violates Article 7(1)); Civil Liberties 
Org. v. Nigeria, Commc’n No. 129/94, ¶¶ 1, 18 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and 
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judicial involvement for certain government actions should be struck 
down as contrary to Article 7(1).121 Amendment 16B is similar to 
laws that the Commission has found to violate Article 7(1) because it 
expressly removes judicial access to dispute the legality of 
government takings.122 
Campbell’s situation exemplifies the manner in which 
Amendment 16B strips away landowners’ rights.123 Before 
Amendment 16B was passed, Campbell successfully challenged the 
government’s designation of his land on two separate occasions.124 
After it was passed, he no longer had a cause of action to challenge 
the acquisition in court, and after 90 days, his land automatically 
reverted to the state.125 Not only does Amendment 16B explicitly 
 
Peoples’ Rights 1995) (agreeing that a law which ousts the jurisdiction of the 
courts to interpret laws passed after December 1983 violates Article 7(1) and that a 
State is not able to justify the violation of the Charter by claiming that it is 
following domestic laws); Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, Commc’n No. 101/93, ¶ 
1,3, 13 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1993) (finding that a law 
that prohibits individuals from litigating any issue related to the Nigerian Bar 
Association is a violation of Article 7(1)). 
 121. See, e.g., Purohit, Comm’c No. 241/2001 at ¶¶ 70-72 (asserting that 
individuals have a right to access the courts to challenge laws that violate their 
rights, in civil and criminal cases); accord Civil Liberties Org., Comm’c No. 
129/94 at ¶ 14 (holding that a Nigerian law that prohibits access to the court to 
challenge actions taken by the national bar association is contrary to the principles 
of the Banjul Charter); see also NMEHIELLE, HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, supra note 
69, at 96 (revealing that the Commission’s decisions support an interpretation of 
the Charter that include a right to judicial access in the first instance, and on 
appeal). 
 122. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16B(3)(a) (prohibiting landowners from suing before a court to challenge a 
government taking); see also Heyns, supra note 66, at 690 (relating that the 
Commission has consistently held that laws that oust the jurisdiction of the courts 
are invalid under Article 7(1)). 
 123. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 9-13 (Zim.) 
(reviewing the facts of Campbell’s case during the years he challenged the 
government to prevent his land from being acquired, and then how he was 
prevented from future challenges by Amendment 16B). 
 124. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 9-10. When Campbell’s land was 
designated in 1997, he made a written objection in the administrative body and his 
land was unlisted. Id. at 10. In 2001, his land was designated again, and he 
protested again. Id. This time, he took his claim to the High Court, which declared 
the government’s action invalid. Id. 
 125. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 13 (noting that in accordance with 
Amendments 16A and 16B, Mount Carmel became state property on the day 
Campbell received a preliminary notice that it was to be acquired, which gave him 
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forbid access to the courts, the disparity of outcomes under the same 
facts and circumstances further illuminates that Amendment 16B 
thwarts landowners from pursuing a cause of action that was 
previously available.126 In doing so, it allows land to be acquired by 
the State that an independent court would otherwise find was 
impermissible.127  
When Campbell was denied the opportunity to approach the Court 
to challenge his eviction, Zimbabwe violated his right under Article 
8 of the UDHR and 7(1) of the Banjul Charter.128 In light of the 
interpretations of the UDHR and Banjul Charter by tribunals, it is 
clear that Campbell’s action was intended to be part of the UDHR 
and Banjul Charter’s protection, and that it would be appropriate to 
strike down Amendment 16B for its due process violations. 
2. Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court is not in compliance with its 
Declaration of Rights or the due process standards articulated by the 
SADC Tribunal. 
In Campbell, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court disregarded its 
Declaration of Rights that protects due process.129 The Declaration of 
 
no opportunity to contest the taking in court). 
 126.  CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 16B(3)(a); 
see Heyns, supra note 66, at 690 (relating that laws that take away the jurisdiction 
of the court violate international human rights standards). 
 127. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 9-13 (noting that the only change 
that occurred between the time a High Court ruled that the taking of Campbell’s 
land was invalid in 2001, and when the government acquired his land in 2005, was 
the passage of Amendments 16A and 16B); see also Bernadette Atuahene, 
Property Rights & the Demands of Transformation, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 775-
76 (2010) (arguing that fast-track land reform was a hastily conceived program and 
its due process violations have caused immeasurable harm to the economy, 
Zimbabwe’s international image, and individual stakeholders). 
 128. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8; Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 7(1)(a). 
 129. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16(1)(a)-(e) (stating that “No property . . . shall be compulsorily acquired except 
under authority of law that . . . requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable 
notice . . . requires the acquiring authority to, if the acquisition is contested, to 
apply to the High Court . . . enables any person whose property has been acquired 
to apply to the High Court or some other court for the prompt return of property if 
the court does not confirm the acquisition); see also Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 
49/07, at 15 (asserting that fundamental rights are not immutable and that the 
Declaration of Rights does not protect its citizens from its own Constitution when 
amendments are passed according to strict procedural requirements). 
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Rights requires that landowners receive notice when their land is 
targeted for acquisitions, and it gives landowners the opportunity to 
challenge land acquisitions based on an argument that the taking was 
not “reasonably necessary” to achieve a public purpose.130 
Amendment 16B is an impermissible exception to Zimbabwe’s 
Declaration of Rights that allows the government to flout usual due 
process guarantees for agricultural land redistribution.131 In takings 
for land redistribution only, the government does not have to show 
the taking was reasonably necessary and does not have to provide 
personal notice to landowners.132 No matter the public importance of 
land redistribution, it undermines the rule of law to eliminate due 
process whenever the public purpose is particularly compelling.133  
Instead of recognizing these principles, the Supreme Court agreed 
that Amendment 16B ousts judicial review for land acquisitions, but 
found that it was legal because it was passed with proper legislative 
approval according to prescribed procedures.134 The Court avoided 
actually deciding whether Amendment 16B impermissibly interferes 
with core due process values by claiming that property acquisitions 
are a non-judicial political question, and that when the legislature 
makes an unambiguous law regarding this matter, it is beyond the 
 
 130. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16(1)(a)-(c) (requiring that acquisitions are reasonably necessary to achieve the 
state’s goals, that the landowner get reasonable notice of the government’s intent 
to acquire the land, and that the landowner have opportunity to challenge 
acquisitions in the High Court of Zimbabwe). 
 131. Compare id. art. 16B(3)(a), (4) (allowing land to be taken for agricultural 
distribution without providing the landowner individual notice or an opportunity to 
appeal), with id. art. 16(1) (granting the right for landowners to have notice and a 
right to appeal land expropriation on a showing that the expropriation  was not 
reasonably necessary). 
 132. Id. art. 16B (specifying that the due process protections of 16(1) do not 
apply to the compulsory land acquisitions referred to in 16(2)(a)) . 
 133. See VAN BANNING, supra note 75, at 179 (explaining that Zimbabwe may 
justifiably try to correct land inequalities, but that taking land on a large scale in 
violation of human rights standards undermines basic property protection rights  
that all individuals should be able to rely upon). 
 134. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 15 (Zim.) 
(reciting that the text of the amendments were published in the Zimbabwean 
national Gazette thirty days before the amendments were introduced to Parliament, 
and that at the final reading in Parliament, the amendments  received a two-thirds 
vote). 
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scope of the court to interfere.135  
Not only does this decision contravene the Declaration of Rights, 
it contradicts the Supreme Court’s own precedent in Commercial 
Farmers’ Union v. Minister of Lands in which it held that taking 
private property without notice or a right to challenge the taking 
violated due process.136 Strangely, the Supreme Court did not even 
refer to this decision, or its mandatory precedential value, in its 
Campbell decision.137 By disregarding its own precedent and refusing 
to invalidate a law that flouts due process requirements on its face, 
the Supreme Court wrongly decided Campbell.138 
In addition to these domestic violations, the Supreme Court also 
improperly refused to register the SADC Tribunal’s decision in 
Gramara.139 The SADC Tribunal correctly applied international 
principles and concluded that even if Amendment 16B was passed 
legally, it is still subject to judicial review and that individuals must 
be allowed to challenge takings in court.140 In Gramara, the High 
 
 135. See id. at 28 (commenting that while a general principle is that 
Constitutional provisions should not be construed to take away court jurisdiction, 
property acquisitions are not judicial questions). It further found that the 
unambiguous nature of Amendment 16B leaves no place for judicial interpretation. 
Id. 
 136. See Jeremy Gauntlett, The Lie of the Land: Law and Land Seizure in 
Zimbabwe: 1890-2010, Ninth Mofokeng Lecture (Oct. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php?view=article&catid=49%3Aland-
facts&id=1016%3Alaw-and-land-seizure-in-zimbabwe-1890-
2010&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=89 (quoting the decision in 
Commercial Farmers’ Union v. Minister of Lands (citation omitted) that held that 
fast-track land redistribution flouted notice and appeal requirements in an 
obviously unlawful manner). 
 137. See generally Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 (departing from its 
precedent in Commercial Farmers’ Union (citation omitted) without ever referring 
to the decision). One explanation for the Court’s silence is that it has lost its 
political independence. See Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 622, 624 (asserting that 
after all but one of the Supreme Court Justices resigned in 2000 because they 
feared for their safety, the Court’s independence is in doubt). 
 138. See Romero, supra note 39, at 294 (finding that although the Zimbabwean 
Declaration of Rights expressly protects citizens from deprivation of property, the 
government has disregarded this protection in order to carry out its policy goals).  
See generally Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007. 
 139. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.) 
(declaring that it would be against public policy to register the SADC Tribunal’s 
decision). 
 140. Compare Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 40-41 (holding that since the 
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Court declined to recognize the SADC Tribunal’s judgment as a 
matter of public policy.141 This was incorrect because, as the SADC 
Tribunal held, no public policy or justification excuses denying 
landowners basic due process guarantees.142 By refusing to register 
this decision, Zimbabwe is in violation of its obligations under the 
SADC Tribunal Protocol on the Tribunal that states that all Tribunal 
decisions are binding and must be applied domestically in the State 
implicated by the judgment.143 
C. Amendments 16A and 16B illegally deny landowners 
compensation for land that is acquired for redistribution. 
Zimbabwe is in violation of the SADC Tribunal’s decision in 
Campbell because it has refused to pay adequate compensation to 
landowners for acquired land.144 Although Zimbabwe has conceded 
that international precepts demand fair compensation to owners, it 
has impermissibly denied responsibility to pay landowners whose 
land is taken for redistribution.145 When compensation is not 
 
Applicants were expressly denied the opportunity to go to court and seek redress, 
their due process rights were violated under the SADC Treaty), with Campbell 
Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 28 (claiming that the protection an individual receives in 
the use and enjoyment of private property is not a question for the courts, even if 
the Legislature essentially gives the individual no due process protection at all). 
 141. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.) 
(finding that it is against public policy to register a decision that would require it to 
overrule a prior decision by the Supreme Court and invalidate the executive’s fast-
track land reform policy). 
 142. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 56 (reciting the proposition that 
national law or policy cannot be relied upon to avoid international law 
obligations); see also Shriver, supra note 21, at 445 (asserting that customary 
international law requires due process in all circumstances). 
 143. See SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 104, pt. III, art. 32(3) 
(“Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in 
respect of that particular case and enforceable within the territories of the States 
concerned.”). 
 144. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 56 (claiming that it is impermissible 
for Zimbabwe to rely on Amendment 16A to avoid its international law obligation 
to pay compensation); cf. Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 641 (arguing that when a 
government takes private property without compensation, such action indicates 
that the government is dangerous, anti-democratic, and corrupt). 
 145. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 
16A(1)(c)(ii) (asserting that even if Great Britain refuses to pay landowners, 
Zimbabwe still has no right to pay compensation); see also Campbell Ltd., Case 
No. 2/2007 at 54-55 (focusing on the fact that in Zimbabwe’s arguments before the 
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guaranteed, it undermines the entire land redistribution program by 
breeding anger about unfair deprivation and uncertainty about 
legitimate ownership.146   
While the SADC Tribunal has not had the opportunity to develop 
jurisprudence on this issue, its decision aligns with other human 
rights documents and secondary sources. The American Convention 
on Human Rights explicitly requires just compensation to 
accompany expropriations.147  The American Restatement on Foreign 
Relations also demands “adequate, effective, and prompt” payment 
for land expropriated by a government.148 Applying these principles 
and Zimbabwe’s own concession that international precepts demand 
compensation, the SADC Tribunal appropriately found that 
Amendment 16A violates this right to compensation.149  
After determining that compensation is required, the Tribunal was 
not convinced that Amendment 16A’s compensation clause is an 
effective or meaningful way to provide compensation. By deflecting 
responsibility to Great Britain, which has not agreed to pay 
landowners for taken property, no compensation is provided at all.150 
 
Tribunal, it never disputed that Applicants are entitled to compensation, but rather, 
who should pay it); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 
712(1)(c) (1987) (calling it a violation of international law when a taking is not 
accompanied by just compensation). 
 146. See MAPOSA, supra note 30, at 88 (determining that non-compensation 
both undermines the rule of law and produces doubt in the people that its 
government is committed to justice). 
 147. See American Convention, supra note 32, art. 21(2) (“No one shall be 
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of 
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms 
established by law.”); see also Shriver supra note 21, at 450-51 (arguing that 
adequate compensation near market value is required under international law, and 
while the United Nations and Restatement of Foreign Relations may introduce the 
idea of less than market value, tribunals have ignored this approach in practice). 
 148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 145, § 
712(1)(c) (stating that “A state is responsible under international law for injury 
resulting from a taking by the state . . . that . . . is not accompanied by provision for 
just compensation.”); see also Hellum & Derman, supra note 27 (claiming that 
compensation for expropriation is an established international law principle). 
 149. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 54-55 (emphasizing that in 
Zimbabwe’s arguments before the Tribunal, it never denied that Applicants are 
entitled to compensation). 
 150. See id. at 56 (noting that Zimbabwe is using Amendment 16A to avoid 
paying the petitioners, even though they have a clear legal title, thus preventing the 
petitioners from receiving any meaningful compensation); accord Shriver, supra 
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Because Amendment 16A effectively denies compensation, the 
SADC Tribunal appropriately directed Zimbabwe to pay landowners 
who had been denied compensation.151 Zimbabwe is in breach of its 
SADC obligations by continuing to refuse to pay fair compensation 
to any landowners whose land has been taken.152  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To account for the human rights violations to property and due 
process, Zimbabwe must make major changes to its laws and provide 
redress for the victims who have already suffered.153 If it fails to do 
so, the international community must step in as best as it can to 
legally protect victims of Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform 
program.154 
 
note 21, at 450 (asserting that Zimbabwe may be able to pay less than fair market 
value for land, but not paying for the land at all is not justified). 
 151. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 58 (directing Zimbabwe to pay fair 
compensation, before June 2009, to the petitioners whose land had already been 
taken). 
 152. See Fick v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 01/2010, 2 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 
2010) (noting that instead of compensating landowners as the SADC Tribunal 
ordered, Zimbabwe has endangered the lives and property of those who its 
decision was meant to protect); cf. SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 104, pt. 
III, art. 32(3) (mandating the SADC Tribunal make binding decisions that are to be 
enforced within the territory of the State concerned). 
 153. See Nading, supra note 35, at 798-800 (advising Zimbabwe to stop 
appropriating white-owned farms, and stop antagonizing the commercial farmers 
who still form a crucial part of the economy). 
 154. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 693 (detailing the United States, Great Britain, 
and International Monetary Fund’s decision to terminate aid to Zimbabwe because 
of perceived violence related to resettlement). In addition to political and 
diplomatic efforts like ending aid or imposing sanctions, international, regional, 
and foreign courts should continue to provide a forum for farmers whose land has 
been expropriated. These courts include, but are not limited to, the SADC 
Tribunal, South African Courts, and United States courts.  See Campbell Ltd., Case 
No. 2/2007 at 24-25 (granting jurisdiction to hear individual claims based on 
human rights violations and denial of due process, and to develop jurisprudence 
using applicable treaties and general principles of international law); Hemel & 
Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 521 (reviewing South African courts’ willingness to 
register judgments against Zimbabwe); Luke Peterson, Tribunal orders Zimbabwe 
to Pay £7.3 Million to Dutch Farmers, NEW ZIMBABWE (Apr. 28, 2009), 
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/farm91.19740.html (reviewing a decision by 
the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes which  
found that Zimbabwe’s land evictions violated treaty obligations); Peter 
Matambanadzo, Dutch Farmers Seek Compensation, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 21, 
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A. THE ZIMBABWE SUPREME COURT CAN CONFORM TO ITS SADC 
OBLIGATIONS BY REGISTERING THE SADC TRIBUNAL’S JUDGMENT 
DOMESTICALLY. 
Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court should register the SADC Tribunal’s 
decision.155 Although the court in Gramara held that Zimbabwe 
would not register the decision, Gramara was decided by 
Zimbabwe’s High Court.156 If a challenge is brought before the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court should decline to 
follow Gramara’s faulty reasoning and recognize the validity of the 
SADC Tribunal’s judgment.157 Since such a decision would likely 
contradict the Zimbabwean Supreme Court’s Campbell decision, the 
likelihood of this is remote.158 Application of the SADC Tribunal’s 
Campbell decision is, however, required in order for Zimbabwe to 
conform to its international legal obligations.159 
 
2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010210293.html (reporting that farmers have 
approached the U.S. District Court of New York to attach Zimbabwean assets in 
the United States to compensate farmers for expropriated land). 
 155. See Fick v. Republic of Zim., Case No. 01/2010, 2, 4 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. 
Trib. 2010) (reminding Zimbabwe that the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Campbell 
Ltd. (citation omitted) is binding and enforceable in Zimbabwe territory and 
admonishing Zimbabwe for not complying with the decision, and referring the 
matter to the SADC for appropriate action). 
 156. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.) 
(deciding not to register the SADC’s Tribunal judgment). 
 157. Practically, this seems unlikely, particularly considering the composition of 
the court. See Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 638 (questioning the independence of 
Zimbabwe’s judiciary). 
 158. The SADC Tribunal has now released two decisions noting that Zimbabwe 
has failed to comply with the Tribunal’s judgment in Campbell Ltd. (citation 
omitted) and meet its obligations under international law. See Fick v. Zimbabwe, 
Case No. 01/2010, 4 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2010) (reviewing its 2009 decision 
that Zimbabwe had not complied with its judgment in Campbell Ltd. (citation 
omitted), and finding that non-compliance was continuing). Zimbabwe’s failure to 
comply with the SADC Tribunal signals that it will continue to ignore its 
obligation to register the judgment. 
 159. See discussion, supra Part II (arguing that Zimbabwe is in violation of 
international law for failure to protect the rights of landowners to hold property 
free from arbitrary takings, to have their due process rights upheld, and to receive 
compensation when such property is seized). 
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B. ZIMBABWE SHOULD REPEAL AMENDMENTS 16A AND 16B AND 
ADOPT A NEW LAND REFORM LAW THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFERENDUM. 
In a more likely scenario, the Supreme Court will not register the 
SADC Tribunal judgment or even consider another challenge.160 
However, Zimbabwe is currently undergoing a constitutional reform 
process, and land reform continues to be a pressing concern.161 The 
major opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change, is urging 
changes to the land reform law and has complained that fast-track 
land reform is exploitive, unfair, and illegal.162 The Commercial 
Farmers’ Union also advocates for major constitutional reform.163 
The constitutional reform process should be a stakeholder-driven 
process that receives input from the potential beneficiaries of land 
and those whose land may be affected.164 It should focus on 
providing more transparency and protection for current owners while 
respecting the right of landless Zimbabweans to have access to 
property.165 
 
 160. This assessment is based on Zimbabwe’s failure to address the issue in the 
Supreme Court since the SADC Tribunal originally decided Campbell Ltd. in 
2007. 
 161. See Lloyd Msipa, Land and the New Zimbabwe Constitution, LLOYD 
MSIPA: POLITICS & LAW (May 27, 2010) http://msipa.blogspot.com/2010/05/land-
and-new-constitution-lloyd-msipa.html (proposing replacement provisions for 
Amendment 16B that are less controversial while still addressing the necessity of 
redistribution). 
 162. See Land and Agriculture, MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, (Nov. 
22, 2009), http://www.mdc.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content& view=article 
&id=133&Itemid=124  (promising that if elected, the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) party would ensure that land reform would stop benefiting 
government officials and cronies, that it would conduct an audit of current land 
redistribution, and that it would form a Commission to investigate corrupt 
practices); see also Rutherford, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that the MDC 
considers fast-track resettlement a violation of property rights). 
 163. See INTRODUCTION TO THE AGRICULTURAL RECOVERY PROPOSAL, ARAC, 
(2010), http://www.cfuzim.org/images/arpintro.pdf (last visited Sep. 25, 2011) 
(demanding that constitutional change is necessary for agricultural recovery, as is a 
Land Commission to investigate the land reform program). 
 164. See Rutherford, supra note 1, at 111 (observing that such a process would 
be in the interests of civil society, opposition groups, and government technocrats). 
 165. See MANBY, supra note 34, at 43 (asserting that change must occur to 
protect poor Zimbabweans who are suffering the most under fast-track land reform 
and who have the fewest options to obtain recourse). 
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Because of the devastating social and economic impact that the 
fast-track law has had on Zimbabwe, Amendments 16A and 16B 
should be repealed.166 A new law should call for an immediate end to 
expropriations and establish a commission to resolve and investigate 
potential human rights abuses since 2000 or earlier.167 Under a new 
law, land redistribution must continue.168 Land redistribution, legally 
implemented, is essential to post-colonial nations and to economic 
recovery in Zimbabwe, but it must be done in a way that will diffuse 
tensions and ensure compliance with international law.169  
A new law should be based on a willing buyer, willing seller 
method with the right of first refusal to the government.170 
Admittedly, this type of negotiated land reform is slower than land 
expropriations, particularly the fast-track expropriations that are 
currently being done.171 However, a somewhat slower process will 
strike a fair balance between meeting Zimbabwe’s land reform goals 
in a timely manner and avoiding violations of basic human rights.172  
 
 166. See id. (advocating for the immediate cessation of fast-track land reform). 
 167. Cf. Romero, supra note 39, at 296 (proposing the creation of a truth and 
justice commission to investigate human rights abuses related to property 
deprivation). 
 168. See Todd Moss, Zimbabwe’s Meltdown, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133, 
141 (2007) (asserting that despite the controversies surrounding Zimbabwe’s 
tactics, no one denies how important it is for a fair land distribution process to be 
completed); see also Kevin E. Colby, Brazil and the MST:  Land Reform and 
Human Rights, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 18 (2003) (asserting that the lack of a land 
reform program could also be a human rights violation). 
 169. See Atuahene, supra note 127, at 778-79 (explaining that redistribution 
gives land to people who were unjustifiably dispossessed under racist colonial 
practices, which makes land reform an essential ingredient to recovery). 
 170. See Shriver, supra note 21, at 429 (explaining that the right of first refusal 
requires anyone who wishes to sell their land to offer it first to the government, 
which can either buy the land or allow it to be placed on the private market). 
 171.  But see Rutherford, supra note 1, at 105 (revealing that although 
proponents claim that fast-track reform is the most efficient way to conduct land 
reform, the results do not match the rhetoric). Five years into fast-track reform, 
almost 6,000 farms were acquired by the government in an expeditious manner, 
but eighty-six percent of those farms had yet to be confirmed or actually given to 
beneficiaries. Id.  Cf. VAN BANNING, supra note 75, at 333 (arguing that quick 
radical approaches to land reform are bound to fail and likely to lead to human 
rights violations). 
 172. Cf. Shriver, supra note 21, at 454-55 (comparing Zimbabwe’s land reform 
issues to Namibia, remarking that while Namibia’s slow land reform process may 
present frustrations, more hasty land reform measures would potentially result in 
human rights violations similar to those in Zimbabwe). 
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1. South Africa should be used as a model for land reform 
legislation. 
South Africa has approached land reform from a few different 
angles.173 This includes the willing buyer, willing seller market-based 
approach to redistribution, land restitution, and strengthening tenure 
security.174 South Africa’s land reform law has met some of the same 
frustrations as Zimbabwe in terms of slow progression.175 However, 
its government has accepted that slowness is a price that must be 
paid to ensure rule of law.176 South Africa is an appropriate model for 
Zimbabwe because the two states are regionally proximate, have 
similar colonial histories, and traditionally rely on one another for 
judicial guidance.177 While Zimbabwe should focus on negotiated 
land reform through the willing buyer, willing seller, it would also be 
useful to consider measures to strengthen tenure security for land 
occupants that do not have proper titles.178 
If expropriation continues in Zimbabwe, it must actually distribute 
land to the landless.179 By some estimates, more people have been 
 
 173. See Atuahene, supra note 127, at 784-95 (exploring South Africa’s land 
restitution, eminent domain, tenure security, and negotiated land reform strategies). 
 174. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 678-80 (separating South Africa’s land reform 
into three prongs that consist of restitution, redistribution, and land tenure).  But 
see Claxton, supra note 1, at 549 (opining that a market-based model limits the 
scale of land redistribution and prevents true reform). 
 175. See Carson, supra note 84, at 414-15 (complaining that negotiated land 
reform can slow reform efforts by inflating prices and leaving the buyer with fewer 
resources post-purchase). In some cases, this concern can be resolved by grants or 
loans given by the government or international community. See also BINSWANGER-
MKHIZE, supra note 22, at 21 (comparing programs where the government was the 
buyer to programs where individuals were able to buy land directly from the 
owner). 
 176. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 695 (referring to the South African 
Government’s assertion that it would never tolerate the same type of violence and 
uncertainty that has occurred in Zimbabwe). 
 177. See Sarah E. Hager, Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-
State Actors Failed to Effectively Regulate Mugabe’s Policy of Internal 
Displacement, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 253-54 (2007) (reviewing the extensive 
similarities between Zimbabwe and South Africa, from their colonial histories, to 
their economic and trading ties). 
 178. See BINSWANGER-MKHIZE, supra note 22, at 398 (assessing the benefits of 
tenure security to increase investor confidence, reduce conflict, and provide a 
transparent legal framework to assess ownership). 
 179. See, e.g., Kinsey, supra note 23, at 178 (providing evidence that much of 
the acquired land has been given to high-ranking government officials). 
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displaced by Zimbabwe’s fast-track program than have been 
resettled.180 Because the fast-track program has been effective in 
expropriating land, but less so in fair redistribution to the landless, a 
new law that allows expropriation should be crafted to require more 
oversight for land authorities and stricter penalties for fraud or 
misuse of position.181  
Additionally, if expropriations do continue in Zimbabwe, South 
Africa should be the model.182 While South Africa has not avoided 
all the problems of Zimbabwe, it has engaged in thoughtful land 
redistribution that addresses the valid needs of its dispossessed 
citizens while complying with international law.183 This includes fair 
notice, compensation, and access to challenge acquisitions in 
court.184 These three components are crucial elements to any 
expropriation law and are necessary to meet UDHR and Banjul 
Charter standards.185 
 
 180. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1800 (considering the vast 
numbers of farm workers who have lost their jobs and been displaced because of 
land reform measures); see also Romero, supra note 39, at 275 (commenting that 
Operation Murambatsvina, which was a program designed to clean-up the cities in 
Zimbabwe, has displaced over 700,000 people who lived in informal housing). 
Many of these people were in informal housing after being collaterally displaced 
during land reform efforts. Id. at 279. 
 181. See MANBY, supra note 34, at 30 (criticizing the fast-track program for not 
providing proper oversight or a transparent process); cf. Claxton, supra note 1, at 
550 (suggesting that one way to lesson conflict in expropriations is to target 
absentee owners who have fewer stakes in the land). 
 182. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 25(2)-(3) (subjecting property expropriations 
to procedural limitations that include non-arbitrariness, just and equitable 
compensation, and access to courts to confirm the fairness of compensation); cf. 
Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 641 (recommending that South Africa be influential 
in resolving Zimbabwe’s land reform crisis). 
 183. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 696 (complimenting the cautious approach that 
South Africa has taken to land reform which has allowed it to avoid politically-
motivated violence or a disregard for the rule of law). 
 184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 145, 
at § 712(1)-(3) (asserting that international law demands that States pay 
compensation for acquisitions, provide a forum to challenge acquisitions, and not 
take land in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner. 
 185. See Mielnik, supra note 60, at 617-18 (explaining that the three basic 
elements for expropriation to be considered fair are public purpose, non-
discriminatory implementation, and compensation). 
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C. INDIVIDUALS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK LEGAL REDRESS FOR 
ZIMBABWE’S VIOLATIONS OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS BY 
APPROACHING FOREIGN, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS. 
In the alternative, in which Zimbabwe does not reform its law, the 
SADC Tribunal should continue to be used by commercial farmers to 
vindicate their rights.186 As South Africa has demonstrated by 
registering the SADC Tribunal’s decision domestically, States other 
than Zimbabwe may take steps to provide damages to landowners.187 
Plaintiffs may also approach other courts besides the SADC Tribunal 
and South African courts.188 In fact, some victims of Zimbabwe’s 
land reform have already attempted to approach U.S. courts to obtain 
judgments against Zimbabwe.189 Creative use of different fora is not 
an ideal way to provide redress for victims, but until Zimbabwe 
adopts measures to reform its law, it may be the most practical 
remedy for landowners.190 
CONCLUSION 
Amendments 16A and 16B fall short of the basic human rights 
standards articulated in the UDHR and Banjul Charter that 
 
 186. See Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 518 (praising the activeness of 
the tribunal in enforcing human rights standards and its usefulness for future 
litigation). 
 187. See Steve Hofstatter, SADC’s Zimbabwe Property Ruling Enforced in SA, 
BUSINESS DAY (Feb. 26, 2010, 7:10 AM), http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/ 
Content.aspx?id=94802 (reporting that the South African judiciary determined that 
the SADC Tribunal’s ruling against Zimbabwe is enforceable in South Africa). 
 188. See Matambanadzo, supra note 154 (reporting that even in the United 
States, commercial farmers whose land was confiscated in Zimbabwe are 
approaching the courts  to recover some damages for their lost property). While 
these farmers are relying on the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the 
SADC Tribunal’s decision may be used as a reference to prove the propriety of 
awarding a judgment in favor of the farmers. Cf. id. (stating that the farmers want 
the judgment to be made in accordance with the U.S. Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act). 
 189. See id. (reporting on thirteen Dutch nationals who have filed an application 
in District Court in New York for compensation for their confiscated farms). 
 190. See Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 522 (praising the SADC 
Tribunal and South African courts for taking measures to attach Zimbabwe’s assets 
to enforce awards). 
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Zimbabwe is obligated to follow.191 In addition, Zimbabwe is in 
violation of its obligations to the SADC Tribunal’s decision by 
refusing to register the Tribunal’s judgment that Amendments 16A 
and 16B are arbitrary, do not provide due process, and do not provide 
compensation to owners.192  
In addition to the legal violations, Amendments 16A and 16B are a 
detriment to Zimbabwe and its people.193 Its economic collapse and 
flagrant human rights violations have led many to label Zimbabwe as 
a state in crisis.194 While much of the harm stemming from this fast-
track land reform has done irreparable damage, a change in policy 
and the cessation of fast-track land reform would be notable and 
would encourage steps towards returning the rule of law to 
Zimbabwe.195 In the meantime, it is up to international tribunals like 
the SADC Tribunal and foreign states to condemn fast-track land 
reform and provide a forum for victims to access legal remedies.196 
 
 
 191. See discussion, supra Part II (discussing Zimbabwe’s violations of the 
protection to property, the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation, and the right to 
due process of law). 
 192. See discussion, supra Part II (arguing that Zimbabwe must comply with the 
decision of the SADC Tribunal, in accordance with its obligations under the SADC 
Treaty, which it has ratified). 
 193. See VAN BANNING, supra note 75, at 179 (observing that Zimbabwe’s land 
reform has undermined its social fabric, isolated it in the international community, 
and discouraged investment into the economy). 
 194. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 4, at 590 (providing readers with an 
overview of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe stemming from land 
reform). 
 195. See, e.g., MANBY, supra note 34, at 43 (referring to a conference in which 
civil society groups agreed that fast-track land reform must end to bring the rule of 
law back to Zimbabwe). 
 196. See Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 523 (encouraging the use of the 
SADC Tribunal, with the cooperation of national courts, to tackle human rights 
abuses in Zimbabwe). 
